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Summary findings
Sound public policy addresses  cxternalities direcdy,  from energy, toward labo., capital, and materials
when possible.  Air pollution is best alleviated by policy  * Substitutionl  toward cleaner  fuels can also be
instruments that internalize the social cost of pollution,  induced without increasing  energy prices generally,  by
making it attractire to reduce emissions.  increasing  the pricc of the dirtier fuels, thereby reducing
- One such instrument might be a tax levied on  the relative price of the clcaner ones. But
individual emissions,  if they are measurable and if there  noncompensated price increases  for the dirtier fuels, plus
is an accepted relationship between emissions  and the  increases for all fuels, will be more powerful since they
damages  tu society. But such first-best solutions may not  will also induce firms to reduce their overall energy use.
be feasible for many reasons, among them the cost of  In exploiting interfuel substitution, it is important to
implementation.  When first-best instruments are  asscss  the relative damagc caused by different pollutants.
unavailable,  indirect instruments, such as presumptive  In Indonesia, increases  in coal prices could deliver
taxing of polluting inputs, may be a powerful alternative.  reductions in particulate emissions, but in Chile they
Energy pricing is, for air pollution, one such indirect  would not, because of a small own-price elastcity and a
instrument,  positive cross-price  effect (though small) to electricity, a
Energy pricing policies affect emissions  through fuel  hcavily-used  source of cncrgy that also produces
substitution and cncrgy  conscrvation. Eslcdand,  Jimenez,  partirulate enissions.
and Liu provide an empirical  framework for measuring  Higher prices for pollution-laden fuels will generally
the magnitude of this impact and apply it to two cases:  reduce demand, as expected, but the net effect on
manufacturing in Chile and Indonesia. They find that:  emissions will depend on:
e  The responsiveness  of emissions makes energy prices  - Whether other fuels laden with the same pollutants
a powerful indirect tool for reducing emissions.  are spared such price increases.
* There is room for substitution toward cleaner input  *  Whether their cross-price  elasticities  are positive.
combinations  - both toward cleaner fuels and away  *  Which fuel shares are high.
This  paper-aproductofthe  PublicEconomics  Division,  PolicyResearch  Department-is  part of  larger  effort  in  the department
to analyze  pollution  control  policies  in a welfare  economic  perspective.  The study  was funded  by the Bank's  Research  Support
Budget  under the research  project "Pollution  and the Choice of Policy  Insmunents  in Developing  Countries"  (RPO 676-48).
Copies  of the paperarc availablec  fre  from theWorld Bank,  1818 H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Car[ina
Jones, room NIO-063,  extension  37699 (33 pages).  July 1994.
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A fundamental  principle of sound public policy is, if possible, to address an externality directly.
Thus, an amount of air pollution in excess of socially optimal levels can best be alleviated by policy
instruments which internalize, for the polluter, its full social cost.  One such instrument might be a tax
levied on individual emissions, if these are measurable and there is an accepted relationship  between
anissions  and the damnage  caused to society.  Such a tax would be set equal to the marginal social
damnages,  to stimulate optimal control efforts frmn polluters.!
However, for a variety of r-easons,  such first-best  solutions may not be feasible.  One reason is
the cost of implementation. Itnmay  be very costly to monitor the flow of emiissions  from each and every
polluter if there are many of them, as in the case of motor vehicles and mnfcuigfinn.  There have
been practical ways developed to minimize the heavy monitoring and enforcement activities associated
with taxes levied directly on emissions,  such as setting standards for emission  rates by type of equipment
or  activity (Opschoor and  Voos,  1989)  .2  However, studies  show that  these policies  should be
complemented  by taxes on the throughput in the polluting activities (Eskeland 1993).
Thus,  when first-best instrumnents  are unavailable, indirect instruments, such as presumptive
taxation of pollutin  inputs, may be atftracive  and powerful alternatives (Eskeland and Iimenez, 1991).
Energy pricing is, for air pollution control, one such indirect instrument.  It is potentially attractive to
'na  framework of  Coasean negotiation, an  efficient outcome (with  different distributional
implications)  could also result if the polluter were subsidized  by its "pollutees  " to cut its emissions.
'For vehicular emissions, there may be millions of polluters, and the costs of monitoring individual
flows of emissions would have been insurmnountable.  However, the pollution-causing  equipment to be
modified is produced by a few, identifiable  producers, and the automobiles  can, in polluted cities, be
compelled to show up for periodic inspections at a manageable number of sites.  Thus, regulations
concerning mzachinery,  in combination  withjkfle taxes, can give a reasonably efficient control program
without continuous  monitoring of emissions at the source (see Eskeland, 1993). For industria sources,
it is generally possible to measure emission  rates, which can be multiplied by utIlization  rates to form the
basis for emiission  taxes or emiission  permits. For major stack sources, such as power plants, continuous
emission  monitoring is now feasible  for some pollutants. In most jurisdictions, however, pollution control
agencies are limited to nmaking  meaurements of emission rates, usually with infrequent preannounced
visits  (See  Russell,  1990).X  2 
the policymaker because the use of each energy carrier, or fuel', provides a good proxy for the rate of
use of polluting equipment (sometimes also its "dirtiness") most of which is combustion equipment.
Thus, if individuals and fims  are induced to economize with fuel use, or to switch to cleaner fuels, then
their eniissions will be reduced.  A good illustration of this is the Environmental Protection Agency's
standard reference on emission modeUling,  AP-42, which projects emissions by multiplying a constant,
an emission factor, by the amount of fuel used (U.S. EPA, 1986).
Fuel substitution and energy conservation are the two main transmission mechanisms by which
changes in energy pricing policies affect emissions.  The main objective of this paper is to provide an
empirical framework for measuring the magnitude  of this impact (section 2) and to apply it to two cases
for  which fuel pricing  could be  attractive policy instruments: manufactg  in  Chile and Indonesia
(sections 3 and 4).  The analytical approach is to combine estimates of how fuel demand responds to
prices, through econometric analysis, with engineering estimates of the technical link between input use
and emissions.  (The property described in the preceding paragraph is used to assign emissions to input
use.)  The main finding is that the responsiveness of emissions makes energy prices a powerful tool in
the Idt of indirect policy instruments available to the policy maker.
The relevance of our findings for control costs and straWt  analysis is, however, not limited to
the case in which fuel prices are used as policy instruments.  Since analysis with first best instruments
for manufacturing would be prospective (such instruments have not be used), one would need to analyze
control costs using models of what polluters could do to reduce emissions.  Analysis of substitutability
in input demand, as well as technical control options, would be the main components in such prospecive
3Our  use of the word energy is conventional: From the user's perspective, energy is an aggregate
of electricity and inputs used in combustion  processes, such as fossil fuels and biomuass.  We sball use the
term  "energy conservation" whern  aggregate energy use per unit of output is reduced. Unconventionally,
we shall include electricity when we use the word "fuels". This way, the term "interfuel substitution"
includes choices between purchased electricity and conventional fuels. If conventional fuels are used by
the firm to produce electricity, then this is accounted for as conventional fuel consumption only.3-
analysis (see Kopp 1992, for a general analytical framework, proposing eclectic use of knowledge from
technical studies as well as econometric models).
The final section (5) discusses briefly the conditions under which it wGuld  also be economically
efficient to use fuel pricing in emission control programs.  The rest of this introduction elaborates on how
this paper straddles two (mostly distinct) bodies of literature - those of energy demand and pollution
control.
Relationshir to the literature.  One of the paper's contribution  is to add to the body of quantitative
evidence on the price responsiveness of energy demand in developing countries.  Since the first oil price
shock in  1973,  there has been a  substantial literature on the price  sensitivity of demand  in OECD
countries. 4 The evidence from aggregate dat  is that there is substantial scope for energy conservation
and interfuel substitution.  In OECD, manfa  in  output increased by 62 percent between 1971 and
1988, while energy use remained unchanged, implying a 38 percent reduction in energy intensity (Bacon
1992).  Using annual observations across Canadian provinces, Fuss (1977) found relatively large own
price elasticities for fuels, in the range of -.7 to -2.9.  His estimate was -.5 for aggregate energy- Using
cross-country  data,  Pindyck (1979),  found  corresponding estimates of  -.7  to  -2.2  (fuels),  and  -.8
(aggregate energy).
Studies from developing countries are less numerous, but growing.  Pindyck (1979) explains the
high  elasticities he  found  for  Spain,  Greece,  Turkey,  Brazil  and  Mexico as  "consistent with  the
expectation that energy demand in  the industrial sector should be  more price  elastic in  developing
countries due to a greater ability to substitute low-priced labor." (p. 255).  There have also been demand
'Bacon (1992) examines evidence from aggregate data series, discusses evidence from econometric
as well as engineering approaches to assessment of inter-fuel substitutability  and energy conservation, and
also reviews empirical findings.  The empirical literature in  the seventies generated methodological
advances, as well as empirical estimates. Important landmarks, both critical to the method applied here,
are flexible functional forms, such as the trans-log fimction  (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1971), and
the use of separability and homotheticity in the energy aggregate (Hudson and Jorgenson, 1974, Fuss,
1977), allowing the estimation of  systems with more inputs.  Fuss  (1977) summarizes these, and
demonstrates the methodology applied in the present study.-4-
studies for the two case study countries in the present paper.  Pitt (1985) used pooled cross section data
from Indonesian manufacturing  industries. With only three years of data (1976-78) and two aggregate
inputs (energy and labor) he finds own price elasticities  for aggregate energy between  -.07 and -.8, with
the higher for the more energy intensive sectors.5 Moss and Tybout (1992), using plant-level data from
Chile, finds substantial variability in fuel use per unit of output  between firms and over time, even within
subsectors. In another study, Guo and Tybout (1993) estimate inter-fuel  substitution  possibilities  for four
subsectors, using plant observations.  They find significant substitutability  for some sectors, little in
others.
Although there have been previous demand studies of the case-study countries, this paper adds
to the literature by using more recently  available time-series  data for a much longer  period (in Indonesia,
1975-89), and by providing results for the manufacturing  sector as a whole. It also focuses on cross-price
elasticities for a disaggregated  set of fuels.  Thus, it provides results that are directly relevant for the
responsiveness  of emissions from manufacturing.
The other, and perhaps more innovative,  contribution  of this paper is that it combines  information
on the flexibility in fuel choice with its consequences  for air pollution, thus making the link between
prices and emissions explicit.  To our knowledge, this has been done before only for one 'pollutant",
carbon dioxide, and even then, without empirical estimates  of inter-fuel  substitutabilitVJ.
5He  used plants as observations  (and a tobit type estimator  to solve the problem of corner observations
in the energy submodel, since some plants used zero of some types of fuels), and estimated models for
seven two-digit ISIC sectors (with dummy variables for each region and each three-digit ISIC code).
'The most interesting modelling is found in Wilcoxen and Jorgenson (1991), where emissions of
carbon dioxide are linked to energy use in an estimated computable general equilibrium model with
investment. As in most CGE models, energy is not disaggregated  into individual fuels, however; thus
the models cannot easily be expanded to analyze whether the choice of fuel allows a choice between
pollutants, or even a general pollution reduction.  Moreover, many of the studies in the huge literature
on the effect of carbon taxes use calibrated rather than estimated  parameters. Our results should provide
useful building blocks for such generl  equilibrium  models in the future.  Other studies are Whalley and
Wigle, 1991, Shah and Larsen, 1992, and Glonisrod, Johnsen and Vennemo, 1992.-5-
Studies linking emissions to fuel use are very rare - in fact, they are available only for a few
developed countries, such as the U.S., based  on sample.  tests and engineer's estimates.  The key result
from these studies is that emiissions  can be modelled  as proportional to fuel use, with emission factors
for each fuel 7 It is precisely this property that we exploit in the developing country case studies.
2. EMIRICAL  FRAMEWORK  AND DATA
This section outlines the cost-function  approach used in the analysis  and briefly describes the data
bases.
Framework.  The general production futnction  summnarizes  the relationship  between inputs used
in production and the resulting outputs:
.''@",'y  =:  t(.  ,.  1
;~~~~~-  f  fVY2 
where y is the quantity of output and x  u  is the quantity used of input i, for n input typee. Pollution, or
7A  fuel may have diffcerent  emission factors for different tsypes  of users. In the short-run, when
equipment  iL  assumed to be unresponsive  to fuel price changes, a fuel's emission  factor for a population
of users will be the individual  factors weighted  by their share in the total fuel demand  change. Assuming
uniform demand elasticities  across users for a given fuel, the factors wil  be weighted  by their shares in
total consumption. It is probably conservative, if anything, to assume that emission reductions will be
proportional to fuel demand: Fuel costs will likely be a  -eater share of costs for users with older,
'dirtier'  equipment, so there may be a systematic  tendency that users with older equipment  reduce their
demand more in response to fuel price increases.  To our knowledge, studies allowing comparison of
demand elasticities  across individual  users of a fuel do not exist, so the assumption  that aggregate  deAmnd
elasticities apply to individual users seerm  reasonable-
'Equation (1) reflects not merely technical relationships,  but also the institutions, such as regulations,
reward systems, etc., in which economic  entities  operate- Thus, while  we make the customary  behavioral
assumptions, such as cost-minimizing,  competitive  producers, in order to write input  demands and output
supplies as functions of input prices and output, we also recognize that if major institutional changes
occur, for instance in regulation, in the way managers are supervised, or in the way owners are taxed,
the relationship  between input  use and outputs (1) may change. This is consistent  with Hayek's warning
(Hayek, 1952) against taking the view of an engineer or a natural scientist when studying economic
systems. The warning becomes  particularly  relevant when we imagine  explicit  pollution control policies,
since tiese  aim to  change,  inter alia,  the relationships between input use and emissions through
institutional reform.-6-
more specifically, emissions of air pollutants, can also be described as determined by the firm's use of
inputs.  If we let e be a mieasure  of the emissions from the producer, we can wrjte 9:
e  e..  . 3...  .(2)
Under certain conventional  assumiptions  about the functionf, an assumption  of cost minimization  allows
us to deduce, from (1), input demands as functions of input prices and output.  This implies that from
X  (2), we can also describe emissions  as a function of input prices and output.
In order to derive the estimating  equations, it is necessary to  put more structure on the general
framework described above.  Following the work of Fuss (1977) and Pindyck (1979), we assume weak
separability between the aggregate inputs: energy (E), capital (K), labor (14  and material OM)  (details in
Appendix 1).  This means that, for the subset of inputs designated as the m types of fuels, x,.  ,,,the
effect of fuel use on output can be summnarized  by its effect on the value of an aggregate energy function
E=E(x,,  . -x,).  Thus, the marginal rates of substitution  between fuels depend on only on the use of
fuels, and the marginal rates of substitution  between aggregate  inputs depend on E but not on the use of
individual fuels.  We assume  thia  the aggregate energy function is homothetic with respect to  its
respective components and  that the cost function associated with  the energy submodel is  linearly
homogenous in aggregate E.
Given these assumptions, the production function (1) above, can be written as:
Y  f  c(K,  L,aM,(.  Eolownx2,  wor  (3)
where KLM  and E  denotes the aggregates capital, labor, material and energy, respectively.  The
corresponding short term cost frnction (whurch  assumes that the amount of capital employed,  K, is fixed)
ef can measure emissions of one pollutant, say tons of sulphur dioxide or dust, or be a vector or an
aggregate, such as a damage-weighted  sum of emissions of various polutapnts.7-
is:
c=cY,JCK,  Pr  ,,  IP  s  R(PI.  ,P2,..IPin))  (4)
where P's with capital subscripts  are prices corresponding  to the aggregate  inputs  , and P's with numerical
subscripts are fuzel  prices.
Given the framework explained  above, the demand for fuelj  can be expressed as:
K1 xi(E (YI  KIPzLlPHJPsE(PlI.  'PM)rFPlIP 2 S.*.Pm)  =  a.c  (5)
where the latter equality is given by Shephard's lemma.
With input demand functions (5) derived from a  cost function like (4),  there will be  two
associated concepts of demand elasticities  with respect to individual  fuel prices 15.  One describes the
substitutability of one fuel for another, while aggregate energy is held constant. The other describes the
substitutability  between inputs (and, among  them, between individual  fuels) when output is held constant,
but the use of aggregate energy and the other aggregate  inputs adjust. The relationships  between  the two
demand elasticities are as follows:
eii=  Egs 1 +  (6)
where e1 jm._, 1 reflects the price elasticity under the assumption  that aggregate energy  use, E, remain:.
constant, and E 2E is the elasticity of aggregate  energy with respect to Ps.
We shall use  both of  these elasticity concepts in analyzing the  effect of price changes on
emissions. Equation (6) allows us to focus on inter-fuel  substitution  in isolation. For examnple,  in a policy
experiment, one could allow compensatory price changes foDr  the energy aggregate, so that PE  is held
constant while the relative prices between fuels are changing  - then the finrn  could be held to the samne7'  -8-
.,.  L
level of zggregate  energy  use.  In fact, since  no other  aggregate  inputs  would  change,  the firm's output
level would  also remain  unchanged.
Assuming  that emissions  depend only on the amounts of fuels used (see footnote 2) and
substituting  fuel demand equations  into (2), we can differentiate  partially to see that the effect on
emissions  of a change  in the price  of fuel  j is the sum  of the partial  derivatives  of fuel  demands  weighted
by the emission  factors. Substituting  ex/llPj for 8x/OPl,  we have an expression  for the elasticity  of
emissions  with respect  to P 3 under  the assumption  that  aggregate  energy  use is held  constant:
O.e  is
P  e  -ECSCn e  eIxIcXIjEC,,,,fl¢  (D)
where  e 1is the partial derivative  of emissions  with  respect  to xi
Similarly,  allowing  for adjustment  in the price of aggregate  energy,  PE,  and thereby  adjustment
in overall  energy  use, we have  the elasticity  of emissions  holding  (only)  output  constant:
pe  i  =  AE.xe 1 Ip  e  =  e  =  -e,  (e1x 11cs,SJ  +  IE  cstant  (8)
Since  own  price elasticities  are generally  less  than  or equal  to zero,  price elasticities  for individuai  fuels
will  generally  be smaller  in real  value  (i.e shifted  farther  below  zero,  if they  are negative)  when  aggregate
energy  is allowed  to adjust  than  under  the restriction  that aggregate  energy  is held constant.
The effect  of a price change  on emissions  depends,  as shown  above, on the sum of demand
elasticities  weighted  by each  fuel's role in emissions,  exi/e. When  we allow  aggregate  energy  to adjust,
cross  price elasticities  as well  as own  price elasticities  will be shifted  downwards  in real value. Thus,
it-is  more  likely  that  emissions  will  be reduced  by a fuel  price increase  when  aggregate  energy  is allowed
to  adjust than when aggregate  energy  use is held constant.  Also, since the energy aggregate  is9 -
homothetic, the own price elasticity for aggregate energy ib also the price elasticity of emissions with
respect to a proportional increase in all fuel prices.
Estimatine technique  and data.  For econometric estimation (details in Annex 1), we use translog
cost functions as local approximations to the energy aggregate and the cost functions.  This procedure
follows that of Fuss (1977) and Pindyck (1979). In each of the case study countries, ve also follow these
authors in estimating functions for the entire manufacturing sector.  The aggregation over plants and
subsectors is largely motivated by economy-  it provides directly a model of the responsiveness of the
sector as a whole, which is relevant for the policy  question at hand.  Since differences in technology may
lead to aggregation bias, building aggregate models on more disaggregated  results would be an importint
area for future research."
Each data set is a census of manufacturing firms and contains detailed plant level cost data,
covering all plants with more than 10 workers (Chile) and 20 workers (Indonesia)'".  The Indonesian
data cover the period of 1975-1989  and the Chilean data cover 1979-1986. The data used in the pooled
cross-sectional time-series analysis are aggregated at the regional level.  The numbers of observations
were  240  for  Indonesia (16  regions times 15 years) and  78 for  Chile (13 regions times 6).  The
geographical delineation enables us to retain the important geographical  variability in input prices, in
addition to the variability over time (no fixed or random effects are used)' 2.
'° For models of select sub-sectors, see Moss and Tybout, 1994, and Quo and Tybout, 1994, (Chile,
initiated under the same research project) and Pitt, 2.985,  and Lee and Pitt, 1987 (Indonesia).
"Indonesia:  Biro Pusat Statistik, Census of Medium and Large Scale Enterprises.  Chile:  Instituto
Nacional de Estadestica, Manufacturing Census.
1 2 Random effects could allow more efficient estimates, but only if regional effects were orthogonal
to regional prices. With fixed effects, most of the important  cross-sectional variation would be elimiinated,
driving down the signal-to-noise ratio in the case of measurement error.-10  -
Fuel consumption data is reported in detail in both data sets, with both quantity and expenditure
figures, allowing construction of fuel-specific price series (unit values) and thus facilitating estimation of
the inter-fuel substitution in the energy sub-model" 3.
In addition to fuel data, the estimation of the aggregate cost share equations needs real output,
real capital stocks, and unit values and cost shares for labor and materials.  For Indonesia, due to lack
of data, only the share equations of different fuels within the energy aggregate were estimated.
For Chile, it was possible to construct the quantity and price measures necessary to estimate the aggregate
model as  well (a short term model, with capital given, allowing for  substitutability between labor,
material and the energy aggregate).
There are six fuel categories, as shown in Table 1.
Table  I.- Fuel Categories
CHILE  NDONESIA
Electricity  Electricity
Fuel Oil  Others (Fuel Oil, Kerosene
Wood, ctc.)
Coal  (two  typs)  Coal  (Coal  and  Coke)
Diesel  (Diesel  and  Destillate  Oil)  Diesel
Grouped Fuels (Firewood,  Grouped Fuels (Gasoline  and
Kerosene, Gasoline, Coke)  High Speed Dicsel Oil(HSDO)
Gas (Natural and Liquid)  Gas (Naturwi)
23 There are nine types of fuel (including electricity) for Indonesia  and twelve types for Chile. Both
data bases have an entry named "Others" for which expenditures but no quantity is reported. Prices for
these were constructed as a weighted  average of other fuel prices-  For a complete description of Chilean
data prepaation,  see Liu (1990).  The Indonesian  fuel data preparation is available upon request.3.  Estimation Results:  Chile
This section examines impacts of price changes on emission in the Chilean manufacturing  sector.
We first describe some basic parameters  regarding fuel prices and emissions.  Then, we present emission
elasticities  under the assump~tions  that overall energy use does not and then does adjust.
Table 2 presents fuel consumption  data for the Chilean  manufacturing  sector.  Electricity  2nd fuel
oil are the two most important fuels in expenditure termns,  whereas fuel oil and coal are the two most
important in energy tenrms  (expressed in TOE, or ton oil equivalents,  which is a measure of heating value,
or calories; this calculation is in terms of heating value to the purchaser). This is because electricity is
a relatively expensive fuel, in terms of heating value, while coal is relatively cheap.  It is also worth
noticing that  the  industry's  expenditure on  energy is 3.7  percent of  its  output value. Thus,  the
consequences for total costs of, say, a doubling of all energy prices, could not possibly exceed 3.7
percent (since, with such a budget increase, the industry could buy the old input combination  at the new
prices).  A more disaggregate  perspective  would show that incidence  is selective  by subsector. Moss and
Tybout (1994) report 8 out of 28 subsectors  with an energy cost share exceeding five percent, with two
exceeding 10 (cement and ceramics).
Table 2:  Chilean Mmuulkchrring.-  Fuel  Coamumption  Data (1965  ___
Percent  of  Percent  of  Enerigy  TOE/bn$  1Price:
]Energy  Cost  Output  share,  Output  $/TOE
Value  (~TOE)
Ecectricity  35.55  1-3  15.7  21655  1  579
Fuel Oil  34.33  1.2  39.6  54778  221
coal  10.36  .4  25.4  35182  104
Diesel  9.55  .3  7.0  9703  347
Gruped  Fs  7.72  .3  10.0  13835  197
NaturAl  Gas  2.49  .11.9  3212  1332
[Total  i0  3.7  100  138354  256-12  -
Since different fuels are bought at different prices per unit of heat value, they cannot be perfect
substitutes for the user.  Fuel oil and coal are relatively cheap energy carriers, but may require more of
other inputs to deliver a unit of output  than is reqdired by, say, electricity. Electricity, on the other hand,
is usually produced  by a  process which wastes much of  the heat value and is  therefore relatively
expensive.  This heterogeneity is the reason why the econometric estimation is needed to draw inference
about how substitutable these inputs are.
The top number of each cell in Table 3 shows estimated emission coefficients by fuel, in terms
of kilograms per TOE.  The pollutant measures  are total suspended particles, or dust (TSP), sulfur oxides
(SO),  nitrogen oxides (NO,J, volatile organic compounds (VOC) and carbon monoxide (CO).  The
calculations are based on standard models for predictions of emissions, given information about the fuels
(US EPA, 1986).  The fuel groups that contain several fuels are calculated as TOE-weighted averages
of the coefficients for individual fuels.  For example, electricity is the most polluting fuel, on a TOE
basis, for both particulates and sulphur oxides.  This is because electricity is assumed to be produced,
at the margin, 50 percent through coal-fired power plants, and 50 percent by clean technologies (say,
hydro).'4 Electricity is thus more polluting than coal, on a TOE basis, since about two-thirds of the
heat value is lost in the conversion to electricity (the pollution coefficients for electricity are, thus, 3/2
times  those for coal).
14In a given year in Chile, hydro accounts for 60-80 percent, but thermal power tends to play a
greater role when demand drives marginal output changes.!13  -
:  ~-  - - -
- - ,  ~~~~Tabl  3:  Chaew m  ufacuig:  Ejbon  Factors QkglTOhl  and eac  Fuel's Role in EmssiJons"s
|FEmission  Factor  |Electricity  Fuel OiE  Coal  Diesel  Grouped  liatwral  Weighted  Total
. (Role.  %)  ~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~Fuels  Gas  Average  Tonslbn  ..Rolc.  . S  Output
MPartcuateS,  TSP  34.8  .9  23.2  .3  10.4  .0  12.8  1765
(42%)  (3%)  (46%)  (0%)  (8%)  (0%)  (100%)
Sox  65.4  31.6  43.6  12.8  4.9  .0  35.4  4873
(29)  (36%)  (32%)  (3%)  (  %)  (O%)  (100%)
NOx  3.6  6.6  2.6  2.4  3.6  .3  4.4  600
(13)  (60%)  (14%)  (4%)  (8%)  (I %)  (100%)
VOC  .3  .3  .2  .0  4.2  .0  .6  88
(7%)  (19%)  (8%)  (0%)  (66%)  (0%)  (100%)
CO  9.6  .3  6.4  .6  137.4  .2  17.1  2337
(9%)  (1%)  (10%)  (O)  (81%)  (0%)  (100%) 
The bottom numbers in each cell in Table 3 (in parenthesis) show the role of each fuel in the
generation of emissions.  They are calculated by multiplying intensities of use, from Table 2, by the
emission coefficients  described in the preceding paragraph.  Electricity  and coal, with 16 and 25 percent
of energy consunption respectively, are each responsible for more than 40 percent of the emissions of
particulates and for around 30 percent of sulphur oxides.  Fuel oil in contrast, with 39 percent of energy
consunption,  is less important in generating particulates, but is the most important fuel in generating
sulphur oxides.
Elasticities: agregate  energy use constant. We will first evaluate emission  elasticities  using the
estimated energy submodel, which describes the extent to which fuels can be substituted for each other
while holding aggregate energy use constant.  Since the own price elasticity of energy by assumption is
non-positive, this gives a conservative  estimate  of the extent to which emissions will fall with an increase
in each fuel price (see equation 8).
;5Assessed  to be in agreement with AP-42 (U.S. EPA, 1986, see Weaver and Reale, 1994).- 14-
Table 4:  Chilean Manufacturing:  Price Elasticties:  Aggregate  Energy  Held ConstaUtn
Electricity  Fuel Oil  Coal Price  Diesel  Price  Grouped Fucl  Natural  Gas
Price  Pricc  Price  Pricc
Electricity  -.98  .45  .11  .22  .21  -.00
_*(.09)  **(.07)  (.09)  **(.07)  **(.05)  (.03)
Fucl  Oil  .55  -.96  .15  .11  .15  -0.1
**(.08)  **I 16)  (.10)  (.09)  **(.07)  **(.03)
Coal  .44  .5  -.00  -.2  -1.05  .31
(.34)  (.33)  (.56)  (.39)  **(.24)  N. 18)
Diescd  .56  .23  -.12  -.82  .75  .4
**(.(18)  (.19)  (.24)  **(.31)  **(.15)  (.13)
Grouped Fucis  .67  .39  -.81  .91  -1.38  .25
__(.  15)  **(.18)  **(.19)  **(. 19)  "(.15)  *(.09)
Natural Gas  -.03  .09  1.07  2.18  1.14  -4.27
. . __  ~~~(.47)  (.43)  *C-63)  **(.7  1)  **e0.39)  **(.63)
Table 4 shows the estimated  price elasticities  of demand when aggregate energy is held ccmstant.
With the exception  of coal, own price elasticities  are generally large in absclute  value, ranging from ..94
for fuel oil to 4.27  for natural gas.  Twenty-two  out of thirty-six elasticities  are statistically  significant
at a five percent level, and an additional  two at a ten percent level. Pindyck (1979) also found own price
elasticities large in absolute value, apart from for electricity, which he explains by the fact that a!nce
electricity is a much more expensive fuel on a thermal basis, it should be used only where there is no
possibility of using an alternative  fuel'  (p. 172).  Such an explanation  may not be valid among Chilean
firms (or those in ohtler developing countries), however, where self-generation of electricity is more
I6Elasticities  reported at means, standard errors on parenthesis.  * denotes a coefficient significant
at  10 % level, ** at 5  % level.  For standard errors,  approximate estimates are (Pindyck, 1979):
var  e 1,!=var  (ij)  /X.15  -
common. Mlany  individual firms in developing countries have substantial primary, or at least, back-up
capacity in order to compensate for unreliability  of supply and lack of access to networks (see Lee et.
al.  1992).  This gives them more flexibility in responding to changes in prices of network-provided
electricity, which is what we have measured in the tables shown in this paper.
Cross  price  elasticities take  both  signs, but  most  of  them  are  positive and  thus  reflect
substitutability between fuels.  Among the most-used fuels - diesel, electricity and fuel oil - the cross
price elasticities are positive, though not all of them are significantly different from zero, even at a 10
percent level.
These data can be used to calculate  the elasticities  of emissions  with respect to each fuel price in
the energy sub-model, i.e. holding aggregate energy use constant (equation 7). In Table 5, we have
shown in some detail, for TSP (dust), how these parameters result from a comibination  of price and cross
price effects, weighted by emiissions  (as shown by equation 7).  In the table, the effects of a price change
are shown in the columns (the effect of changing  the electricity  price, say, is found in the first colunmn);
the changes in emissions due to the change in the use of different fuels are shown along the rows.  The
number in the firs  diagonal element can be interpreted as follows: an own price elasticity of -.98, an
emission factor of 34.8 and electricity use of 22720 TOE per one billion dollars of industrial output
(TOE/bn$)  yields an emiission  reduction  of 7748 kglbn$'s worth of industrial output. The total emission
reduction due to a one percent increase in the electricity price, however, is only 2671 kg/bn$.  Most of
the difference is due to a high positive cross price elasticity with coal.  A negative elasticity of TSP
emissions with respect to the electricity price of -.14 indicates that a ten percent price increase would
result in a reduction in TSP-emissions  of 1.4 percent.  For the fuel oil price, a 10 percent reduction
would lead to a redaction  in TSP emission of 4.3 percent, due to the cross price effiects  with electricity
and coal, which are both heavy in TSP emission. Thus, following a price increase there will generally
be emission  increases due to cross-price  effects that partly or fully compensate  for the emiission  reductions- 16-
due to negative  own-price  elasticities. The overall  result  of changing  a price can be seen in the bottom
row, where  we have  calculated  the elasticity  of TSP  emissions  with respect  to the  various  prices, under
the assumption  that aggregate  energy  use is held  constant.
Table 5:  ITS  EndIms'  Rsponse  to Prike Changes of One Percent
Kilogams pe  raS  Output
Aggregate  ampy  held emoamU
Due to caqg  Elcicit  Fuel Oil Price  Coa Price  Diesd Price  Gmuped Fuel  Naaral  G.as
_  in  Price  lPuce  price
ElectriciLy  Use  -7748  3558  _  70  1739  1660  0
284  497  78  57  78  -5
Fuel Oil Use
Coal Use  3768  4282  4  -1713  -8991  2655
Diesel  Use  17  7  4  -25  23  12
Grouped  Fuels  1008  587  -1218  1369  -2075  376
Natral  Gas  0  0  °  O  a  =  .
T  lotal Ch2nge  in  1i-2671  7937  -274  -i47  -M  3037
TSP  (nS)  1 1  __.  _.  __-_.  I
Pcrcct  Of tl  l  -.14  .43  -.01  .08  -.5  .16
TSP  emissions  I  l
With such  calculations  for each of the pollutants,  Table 6 shows  the elasticities  cf emissions  to
price changes,  holding  aggregate  energy  use constant. We can see that one could  increase  the pnce of
grouped  fuels to reduce  sulphur  emission,  reduce  the electicity price or diesel  price or increase  the
grouped  fuel price to reduce  VOC,  and increase  the coal or grouped  fuel price to reduce  CO.17  -
Table 6: Chilean Manufacturing:  Emiission  Elasticities, Energy Constant
Price  Grouped  Fuels  Price
Particulates  -. 14  .43  -. 02  .08  -. 5  .16
(TSP)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _
SO;  .07  -. 04  .07  .03  -. 22  .11
NO.  .35  -. 41  .03  .11  -. 11  .07
VOC  .51  .15  -.5  .62  -. 95  .19
co  .49  .4  -. 64  .73  -1.19  -23
Elasticities:  angeeate  energy  aLdjustin.  In  the  energy  submodel,  above.  where  aggegate  energy
is  held  constant,  the  "tradeoff'  among  pollutants  is  accentuated,  since  the  use  of  one  fuel  can  only  be
reduced if  the  use  of  other(s)  are  increased.  This  is  not  so  in  the  full  model,  where  aggregate  energy  use
can  be  reduced  in  esponse  to  a  price  rise.  In fact, in that  model,  a  proportional  reduction  in  all  polutants
can  be  achieved  by  a  proportional  increase  in  all  fuel  prices.
Table  7showsprice  elaistiities  for  the  aggregate  inputs:  energy,  labor  and  materals n  a  short
term,  cost  fimction model, i.e. the use of capital is assumed to be given  and output is held constant.
Own price  elasticities are negative (and all are significant at a five percent significance level).  Of
particular  interest  is  the  own  price  elasticity of aggregate energy, -.63.  Note, also, that labor demand
is  relatvely  elastic, and labor is  substitutable  with  energy  as  well as material.  Thus, while labor demand
may be enhanced by policies which keep labor costs to employers down, it is not generally favored by
policies making material and energy less expensive, since  the  substitutability  with  other  inputs  is  quite
strong.-18-
Table 7: Chaed  Manufacturinr  Elstidkes  For Aggrepte  Inputs
'.~~~~~~~~~~~~  1
Witbrespea to ||  Aggregte  |  Wage  Material  Input
Energy Price  Price
Energy  Dernand  **.63  0*1.57  0* .95
(.36)  (.49)  (.31)
Labor  Demand  p.52  *4-1.89  *01.37
(.16)  (.34)  (.30)
Material  *-.07  *0.32  **-.25
Demand  (.02)  (.07)  (.08)
Table 8 shows the price elasticities of individual fuels in the aggregate model, i.e.  allowing
aggregate energy to adjust, as shown in equation (6).  Allowing demand for aggregate energy to adjust
(equation 6), we would expect the absolute values of both own and cross price elasticities  of fuels with
respect to individual fuel prices to be greater.  As we can see by comparing the elasticities with those
in Table 4, this is indeed the case.  Own-price elasticities  are "more negative" and positive cross price
elasticities  have shifted downwards, though only one of them has changed sign from positive  to negative.
Table 8: ChRlean  Manuflcturing: Price Easticities: Aggregte E.uer  Adjuusdn
Elccricity  F.ue Oil  Coal  Price  Diesel  Pnce  Guped  Fud  Nhmr2l  Gas
Price  Price  Price  Price
Electricity  Danamd  -1.20  .27  .05  .13  .13  -.02
Fuel Oil Dernnd  .33  -1.14  .10  .03  .08  -.02
Coal Demand  .22  .32  -.06  -.28  -1.12  .29
Diesel  Demand  .34  .05  -A8  -1.91  .67  .39
Grouped  Fuels  .82  .21  -.86  .82  -1.45  .24
Naunul Gas Dcmand  - .27  1.02  2.10  1.07  -4.27-19-
Table 9: Chilean Manufacturing:  Emission  Elasticities, Aggregate  Energy
Adjusting
Elctriciiy  Fuel Oil  Coal  Pricc  Dicscl  Price  Price of  Natural  TOE
Pric  Price  Grouped  Gas  Price  Price
Particulates  -.37  .25  .07  -.01  -.58  .15  .63
(TSP)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
SO.  -.15  -.22  .01  -.08  -.29  .09  -.63
|NO.  IZ2  -.59  -.02  -.01  -.18  .06  -.63
VOC  .26  .03  -.55  .53  -1.02  .18  -.63
CO  .25  .22  -.69  .64  1.26  .22  -.63
Allowing aggregate energy to adjust, we can also calculate the elasticities of emissions with
respect to each fuel price.  These are given in Table 9, where the figures reflect a stronger tendency that
price increases will lead to emission reductions, as compared to Table 6.  For instance, there are 17
emission  elasticities  with respect to individual  fuel prices that are negative, as opposed to 11 in the model
with aggregate energy constant. As an example  that negative and positive elasticities  are both lower, the
elasticity of TSP emission to the electricity price is -.37, as opposed to -.14 when aggregate energy is
constant. Also the clasticity of TSP emissions to the fuel oil price is .25, as opposed to  .43 when
aggregate energy is held constant. Thus, as price increases  have become more potent instruments for the
emission elasticities  that were negative in the restricted  model, price reductions have become less potent
in the case of positive emission elasticities.
The extreme right column of Table 9 shows that a proportional increase in all energy prices will
reduce all emissions  with the own price elasticity  of aggregate energy  - this follows from the assumption-20 -
that,  the energyaggregate is homethetic, since fuel shares in the energy aggregate will not change unless
relative prices between fuels change.
4. Estimation Results: Indonesia
Fuels  are  categorized and  grouped  somewhat differently  in  Indonesia (Table  10),  thus
complicating strict comparisons  with the Chilean case.  The most important difference  is that fuel oil is
included in a group called 'others", and the category called "grouped fuels' M contains only gasoline and
high speed diesel, and not firewood and coke, as it did in the Chilean case.  Coincidentally, energy
expenditures are 3.7 percent of the value of manufacturing  output in both countries (1985 for Chile, 1989
for Indonesia).  A lower average price of energy in Indonesia (145$/TOE, as opposed to Chile's 256)
is -exactly  compensated  by a higher energy intensity  (256,000, as opposed to 138,000 TOE/bnS output)
indicating an are elastic-ity  of -1, if we were to make inference  on the basis of country comparisons.
Tahle 10: Indmnesia  Manufactring:  Fuel Consumption  Data (1989)
- ~~~~Percent  Of  Percent of  ]Energy  TOEIBn.S  M/TE
Energy Cost  Output  Sharc  Output
Value  (%  TOE)
Electricity  32.0  1.19  6.6  16930  706
Others (incl.f.oil)  15.35  .57  26.4  54778  85
col  5.80  .22  15.4  -39485  55
,iesel  16.36  .61  18.2  6518  131
Grouped  Fuels  25.46e.95  26.5  67  140
Natural  Gas  5.03  .19  6.9  17563  107
Total  ~  ~  ~~~1  -3.73  1  25609  145:=21  -
Relative prices between fuels differ also,  however; fossil fuels are cheaper in 'Indonesia, but
electricity is more expensive. Electricity has about a third of energy costs in both Chile and Indonesia,
but only 6.6 percent in energy terms in Indonesia,  as opposed to 15.7 percent in Chile. This could reflect
the fact that  other fuels have a lower relative price in Indonesia than they do in Chile (last column).
Other differences are also marked.  The "Others" category, which includes fuel oil, accounts for only
26.4 percent in energy terms in Indonesia, as opposed to 39.6 percent in Chile for fuel oil alone.  Diesel,
gasoline and natural gas are more important fuels in Indonesia  than in Chile.
Emission factors (top number of each cell in Table I1) are almost identical to those for Chile,
apart from for grouped fuels, which is lower in particulates and higher in sulphur because it consists of
different component fuels.  "Others" is assumed to consist mostly of fuel oil and would be higher in
particulates, for instance, if wood plays an important role.  The average emission factor, per TOE, is
lower for Indonesia, due to the lower use of electricity, coal and fuel oil.  These three, relatively dirty,
fuels, constitute 81 percent of energy use in Chile, but only 48 percent in Indonesia. Comparing total
emissions per billion dollar worth of output, emissions are higher in Indonesia  for some pollutants, lower
for others.  The reason is that the relatively cleaner fuel composition  in Indonesia is compensated  for by
the higher overall energy intensity in Indonesian  manufacturing.-22  -
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  =7
Tablc LI: Indonesia  Manuracturing:  Emission  Factors  (kg/TOE)  and  each  Fuel's  Role in Emisd  sin'
Emission  flcor  Electricity  Others  Coal  Diesel  Grovuped  Natural  Weighted  TOE/
Role, (76  (mIn.  Fuels  Gas  Average  BN$
_______  _______  _  _____  ____  Coil)  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  O utput
Particulates  (TSP)  34.8  .8  23.2  .3  .2  0  6.2  1598
(37%)  (4%)  (57%)  (1%)  (1%)  (0%)  (100%)
50,  ~~~~  ~  ~~65.4  36.3  43.6  12.8  12.8  0  26.2  67111
(16%)  (37%)  (26%)  (9%)  (12%)  (0%)  (100%)
NO.  3.6  6.2  2.4  2.6  2.6  .05  3.6  9910
(6%)  (46%)  (10%)  (13%)  (23%)  (0%)  (100%)
VOC  .3  .0  .2  .0  .9  0  .3  so
(6%)  (2%)  (10%)  (1%)  (80%)  (0%)  (100)76%  ___
co  9.6  .7  6.4  .6  25.1  .05  8.6  2201
,L~~~~  L-(7%  (2%)  (12%)L  (1  %)  (7%)  (0%)  (100%)  ___
T'he bottom number of each cell in Table 11 shows the roles of different fuels in generating
enmiss  ions.  Since emission factors are about the same, the differences from the Chilean case are mostly
due to differences in fuel use.  As in Chile, electricity and coal are responsible for most dust emissions.
Coal is less important  in energy  use  in Indonesia  than  in Chile,  but has a higher  share in TSP  emissions,
because electricity is less important in Indonesia.  Fuel oil and co  ar  the two important fuels for
sulphur  emissions  in Indonesia,  as in Chile,  while electricity  is less important  in Indonesia.
Elasticities: overall eners  constant.  Table 12 shows the estimated price elasticities of demand
when aggregate energy is held constant. As in Chile, own price elasticities are generally large in absolute
value, ranging from -.83 for grouped fuels to -1.51 for coal.  Eighteen out of thirty-six elasticities are
statistically  significant  at a five percent  level,  and an additional  six at  a ten percent  level.  As in Chile,
we find  an own price  elasticity  for electricity  close to one,  which  is higher tn  those of Pindyck  (USA)
and  Fuss  (Canada).  The prevalence  of self-generation  in  Indonesia  could  explain  (also  as in Chile)  the
higher ekLsticity,  since these computed elasticities are for network provided (or purchased) electricity.
"' Assessed in agreement with US EPA: AP-42.- 23  -
Cross  price  elasticities rake  both  signs,  but  most  of  thorn are  posilive  and  thlus reflect
substitutability be-tween  fuels, as expected.
Taulel12: Indomeula  Mmnulacturlng:  Price  ErnitIidiIe: Aggrepta  Energy  Hlnkd  Cnuxtant"
Eleactricity  Others.'  Coal  Price  Diesel  Price  Grouped  F-uel  Niuuril GIns
Price  Price  Price
Electricity  Demand  -1.02  .17  .09  .04  .80  -.08
___________________  "(.1I1)  '(.09)  *(.04)  (.03)  *(. Is)  *"((12)
Fuel  Oil Demand  .23  -1.26  .04  -.16  1.1  .14
____________________  (.  12)  *(.29)  (.06)  '(0(9)  *(.31)  *(.05)
Coal  Demiand  .27  -.09  -1.51  -.20  -1.06  .06
____________________  "(12)  (.33)  "(12)  (12)  "*(.24)  (.04)
Diese Demand  .06  .23  .09  -1.37  1.40  -.OD
(.04)  (.  18)  '(.05)  "*(.10)  "*(.18)  (.11)
Grouped  Fuels'  .22  .39  -.09  .28  -.83  .01
""(.04)  *"(18i)  "-((02)  *(.04)  "C( 10)  (.0  1)
Natural  Gas  41.11  -.09  .27  -.02  .59  -1.21
___________________  'N.26)  (.43)  (.17)  (1.04)  (.69)  '(.86)
Emission Elasticities: overall energy constant.  We now have the necessary data to calculate the
elasticities of emissions with respect to each fuel price, in the energy sub-model, i.e. holding aggregate
energy use constant (equation 7).  In Table 13 is a full set of emission elasticities.
As for Chile, it is not difficult to find instruments for emission control even holding aggregate
energy constant, although they are not exactly the same.  For TSP control, in Indonesia, price increases
for electricity and coal would help, as they would in Chile.  Price reductions to grouped fuels (diesel and
gasoline) would also help in Indonesia, whereas reductions for fuel oil would help in Chile.  For 50,,
control, price increases for fuel oil and coal or reductions for gasoline and diesel would help in Indonesia,
while there is no obvious instrument if aggregate energy is to be held constant in Chile.
I~Standard  deviation in parenthesis. *denotes  a coefficient significant at 10 % level, i'at  5 %  level.-24  -
-Table 13:  IndonesIa  Manufacturing:  Emisson  Elasticides,  Energy  Constant
With respect  Electricity  Others'  Coal Price  Diesel Price  Price of  Nalural Gas
to:  Price  (mdc.  Grouped  Price
f. oil)  Fuels
Particulates (TSP)  -.21  -.03  -.83  .12  .94  .01
So,  .02  -.44  -.37  -.09  .83  .05
NO.  .12  -.55  -.14  -.17  .67  .07
0  VOC  .14  .15  -.07  .23  -.47  .01
CO  .13  .15  -.09  .22  -.42  .01
Emission elasticities: overall enerav adiustine.  In Table 14, we have calculated  emission
elasticities with aggregate energy adjusting, assuming  an own price elasticity of -.63, as esthiated in the
Chilean case.  While these are calculations for  illustrative  purposes  only (data to estimate the full model
for Indonesia were unavailable),  they are further indicators  of the greater flexibility, and greater tendency
for negative responses of emissions, to price increases when energy is adjusting.
Table  14:  Indonesia  Manufacturing:  Emission Elastcidties, Aggrepte  Energy
Adjusting  Assunung Own Price Elasticity for Aggregate  Energy  = -.63,  as in
Chile
With  respectf Electricity  Others'  Coal  Diesei  Price  of . Natuti  TOE
to:  Price  in.  oil)  Pc  Price  Grouped  Gas  Pnce
Fuels  price
Particulates  (TSP)  -.41  -.13  -.87  .01  .78  -.02  -.63
so.  -.18  -.54  -.40  -.19  .67  .02  -.63
NO  -08  |  -.65  -.17  -.27  |  51  |  .04  -.63
voc  -.06  .05  -.11  .12  -.63  -.02  -.63
CO  -.07/  .05  -.13  .12  -. 5.s  -.02  -.63:25  -
Is there any indication  that the aggregate  energy elasticity for Chile is applicable in Indonesia?
While data availability  precludes  a rigorous  test, the elasticity is in the middle  of the range (-.37 to -.82)
found by Pitt (1985) for Indonesia. While his results are from a model with only two aggregate  inputs,
energy and labor, and for a select set of subsectors, we may note that adopting an elasticity from his
models  would yield similar results. As a conservative  alternative,  Table 13 holds if'  an aggregate  energy
elasticity of 0 is applied.
=. Summary ad  concusions
Emission reductions  can  be stimulated  by changes  in fuel prices, because  of the effects  tha  inter-
fuel and input  substitution  have on the various pollutants. The a priori observations  are tha  emission
elasticities depend on how flexible firmis  are in their input use, how different fuels are in termis  of
carrying the critical pollutants,  and whether  present  fuel shares leave much  room for substitution  towards
cleaner fuels.
Using data from Chile and Indonesia,  this paper has provided some empirical evidence  on the
qualitative  aspect and the quantitative  magnitude  of this effect in developing  countries. The findings  are
that there is room for substitution  towards cleaner input combinations,  both towards cleaner fuels and
away from energy, towards labor, capital  and materials. Also, substitution  towards cleaner,  fuels can be
induced  without increasing energy  prices in general, by increasing  the price of the dirtier fuels to reduce
the prices of the cleaner onies. However, non-comipensated  price increases  for the dirtier fuels, as well
as increases for all fuels, will to a greater extent lead to reductions in all pollutants, since firms will
reduce their overall energy use.
When only inter-fuel substitution  is exploited,  one must be careful to assess the relative  damage
caused by different pollutants.  For both case study countries, if we assume priority for reduced
particulates emissions (dust) because of assocated acute health effects (Ostro, 1994 for Indonesia, and- 26-
Eskeland,  JAtro  and Sanchez 1994, for Chile) increased prices of electricity, as well as general energy
price increases could deliver such reductions.  One needs to be aware of cross price effects, however.
In Indonesia, coal price increases could deliver reductions in particulates' emissions, but in Chile they
would not,  because of a small own price elasticity and positive cross price effect (though small) to
electricity, which is a heavily used source of energy that also carries particulates. Thus, while increased
prices for pollution-laden fuels will generally lead to demand reductions, as expected, the net effect on
emissions will depend on:  whether other fuels laden with the same pollutants are spared such price
increases, their cross price elasticities  are positive, and which fuel shares are high.
The attractiveness of these policy instruments depends ultimately on the other costs of selective
or general energy  price increases. Also, it will depend on governments' ability to implement  alternative
instruments (such as emission  taxes backed  by emission  monitoring) and on the effectiveness  that technical
emission control devices (which reduce emission factors) would have.  Since there is no historical
material of data on firms exposed mainly to first best instruments  such as pollution taxes, studies of what
firms can do to reduce emissions will be synthetic, building on studies of the various avenues that firms
could pursue to  reduce emissions.  This paper  has shown that inter-fuel substitution and  energy
conservation are two such avenues.
Analysis of control costs can only be one input in making concrete policy recommendations,
however.  One also needs information  on the priority given to each pollutant, and implications in other
areas such as government  tax revenues,  administrative  feasibility  and industrial competitiveness. Analysis
in Chile and Indonesia, focusing on health, indicates  that reductions in particulates emissions (dust) should
be of priority.  Price increases for electricity and grouped fuels, and also general energy price increases
would contribute  towards this goal. Whether energy pricing is attractive  as one instrument among others
would also depend on the costs of monitoring and enforcement associated with more direct instrmiets,
such as emission taxes.-27 -
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Annex 1:  Econometric Model for Estimation
The procedure and modelling  framework applied here was pioneered by Jorgenson, Christensen
and Lau  (1971), Berndt and  Christensen (1973), Hudson and Jorgenson (1974) and  Fuss (1977).
Multicollineariry  and computational  problems  associated  with the estimation  of demand  systems with many
inputs are solved by  imposing a  priori constraints of weak separability and homotheticity in input
aggregates' 9.
First, we shall assume that the production function is weakly separable in aggregates of energy
(E), labor (L), capital (K), and materials (M).  This assumption  allows the use of aggregate  price indices
for K, L, M, E in a model of demand for these aggregate inputs.  Second, the aggregate inputs K, L,
E, M, are assumed to be homothetic in their respective components. As shown by Fuss (1977), these
assumptions provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a two-stage optimization process for  the
producers: optimize the mix of components  within each aggregate (taking detailed prices into account),
and then optimize the mix of aggregates  K, L, E and M (taking only the price indices for the aggregates
into account).
The separability of energy from other factor inputs implies-  that the marginal rates of substitution
between any two components of the energy aggregate is independent of the usage of L,  M, K.  In
addition, the energy aggregate is homothetic in its components, so the marginal rate of substitution
between fuels is independent  of E as well.  The two-stage process can thus be described as producers
minimizing the unit cost of energy use by choosing the appropriate fuel mix in the energy submodel
'The  model is  based on Fuss (1977),  where also a  detailed theoretical justification for  weak
separability can be found.- 30 -
before  choosing optimal  inputs of K, L, E and M. For purposes  of econometric  estimation,  the estimated
aggregate  energy  price (or the unit cost of the energy  aggregate)  will be used as an instrumental  variable
in the second stage of the cost function  estimation.:
These assumptions  can be conveniently  expressed by the following  production  function:
y =,0x;  L, .M' E (Y-  x2-..,l  x;))  (10)
where E is a homothetic  function of the vector fuel components  xi, i =  1, ...,n.  Given exogenously
determined  factor prices and output (Y), and capital which is fixed in the short-term,  duality implies the
following short run cost function. 2'
C  =  C  LPLPIP,PE(PIP2,--.PJ),K  ,y]  (2)
Separability  allows us to use the function  PE,  a price index for aggregate  energy, E, which depends only
on the prices of inputs in the energy aggregate (which we will denote fuels although one of them is
electricity).
The aggregate cost function, above, can be represented by the translog second order
approximation:
InC  = cca +  aicslnP;  + >  i>/Qk  + 2y  lPi  lnP; + 2  1  Qk  &Qm
+  S  YhInQ)pQ  (3)
k  i
2 In theory, one can also esimate the aptimal mix of K, L, M, respectively  in the first stage to get
aggregate  price indices, but the lack of disaggregate  price data on the components  of K, L, M prevents
such attempt  In fact, the first stage optimization  is usually limited  to fuel mix.
21  The long rnM  cost fumction,  in contrast, would reflect that the capital stock is at its equilibrium
level.-31 -
where i, j  =  E, L,  M, and k,  m  =  y, K.  By Shephard's lemma, the i'th input demand function,
expressed in terms of input cost share, is:
anC  =PtX  - S-  =  +  Yv InPj + Ey  (F4
FLiP,  C  ii  4
Since the shares must add up to one and the cost function must satisfy the properties  of a well-behaved
production function, the parameters  must satisfy the following  constraints:
=i  = E,M  (5)
YY=  SYj  =  0  ij  =E,
Eyk  =0  i  E, l;  k =Y  K
I
f  =j  Yji  i *j  ij  = ELM
Two measures  given by these parameters  interest  us: the Allen-Uzawa  partial elasticities  of
substitution (  Oj ) and the price elasticities  of demand (  EV ).  These measures can be calculated  as
(Bernt and Wood, 1975):- 33 -
The unit cost function  of energy is assumed linearly  homogenous  in E. Given optimization
behavior, the share of each fuel in energy costs is:
SF  =  Pi  +  £ PVuW  ij  1,...n  (11)
where the following  parameters  constraints  apply:
SPv  =  12P 0 =  0  (12)
J  £
"4=  "9it
The derivations  of the Allen-Uzawa  partial elasticities  of substitution  and energy submodel
price elasticities of demand are similar to equations (6)-(9).
Second Stage  Estimation: The Aemregate  Model.  One result of the first stage estimation,
above,  is a. function, PE=  P E (Ph...  PM), which  can be used in the estimation  of the aggregate cost
fumction  (2), to be estimated  in stage 2.  Combining  the parameters  estimated  in the two stages, we will
find total price elasticities  of fuel demand, allowing  the quantity of aggregate energy to adjust while
output is still held constant  as:
C0 EAgj~g~4  t ES  (13)
E=  CE.  +  ESE,
where  tff.  is the own price elasticity  for aggregate  energy, and  SW  =  ith fuel's share of fuel costs.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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